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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CRUEL OR UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT-INDETER-
MINATE SENTENCE WITH No MAXIMUM TERM FOR A SECOND OF-
FENSE OF INDECENT ExPoSURE is So DISPROPORTIONATE TO THE CRIME
AS TO VIOLATE THE CRUEL OR UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT PROVISION OF
THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION-In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503
P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972).
In 1958, petitioner John Lynch was convicted of misdemeanor
indecent exposure in violation of former California Penal Code section
311, now Penal Code section 314,1 and was placed on two-years pro-
bation.2 In 1967, while being served at a drive-in restaurant, Lynch
was observed through his car window by a carhop, who noticed that
Lynch had his pants unzipped, his hand on his penis, and a "pin-up"'
magazine open on the front seat next to him. Having been momentarily
distracted by the sound of a siren, Lynch suddenly became aware of her
presence and uttered a surprised "oops." She left immediately. Fifteen
minutes later, the waitress allegedly observed through Lynch's rearview
mirror that he was still exposed and reported the incident to the police.
Lynch was thereupon arrested and subsequently convicted of his second
offense of indecent exposure. He was sentenced pursuant to Penal Code
section 314 to an indeterminate term of not less than one year.3  He
appealed to the court of appeal, but his conviction was affirmed.
Lynch spent more than five years in state prison, including three and
one-half years in the maximum security confines of Folsom Prison. He
was denied release on parole four times by the Adult Authority.,
He ultimately filed two applications for habeas corpus with the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court. The first included the assertion that his sentence
1. CAL. PEN. CODE § 314 (West 1972).
2. Lynch could have been sentenced to a maximum 6 months in county jail or a
fine of $500 or both. CAL. PEN. CODE § 19 (West 1972).
3. Penal Code section 314 provides in relevant part:
Every person who wilfully and lewdly ...
1. Exposes his person, or the private parts thereof, in any public place, or in any
place where there are present other persons to be offended or annoyed thereby;
... is guilty of a misdemeanor.
Upon the second and each subsequent conviction under subdivision 1 of this
section, or upon a first conviction under subdivision 1 of this section after a pre-
vious conviction under Section 288 of this code [lewd or lascivious acts upon a
child), every person so convicted is guilty of a felony, and is punishable by im-
prisonment in state prison for not less than one year. (Emphasis added.)
4. In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 414, 503 P.2d 921, 923, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217, 219
(1972).
5. Id. at 438, 503 P.2d at 840, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
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for the 1967 conviction constituted cruel and unusual punishment.6
The second attacked the validity of his 1958 conviction. 7  The appli-
cations were consolidated for hearing by the supreme court. Justice
Stanley Mosk, writing for the majority, determined that the aggravated
penalty for second-offense indecent exposure, punishment of imprison-
ment in state prison for "not less than 1 year," was in effect life imprison-
ment.8 It was this maximum term of imprisonment permitted by
Penal Code section 314 which had to be tested against the California
constitutional limitation of cruel or unusual punishment.' The court
concluded that Lynch's sentence violated article I, section 6 of the
California Constitution ° because, while not cruel or unusual in its
method, it was so disproportionate to the crime involved "that it
shock[ed] the conscience and offend[ed] fundamental notions of human
dignity.""
Prior to Lynch, no California court had adjudged a statutory penalty
unconstitutional on the ground that it was disproportionate to the crime
6. Id. at 414, 503 P.2d at 923, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
7. In Crim. No. 16237, Lynch contended his conviction was invalid because he
assertedly was denied various constitutional rights at the proceedings. This point had
been raised in several prior applications for habeas corpus which had been denied by
the court; it therefore refused to reconsider the issue. 8 Cal. 3d at 439 n.26, 503
P.2d at 940 n.26, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 236 n.26.
8. 8 Cal. 3d at 419, 503 P.2d at 927, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 223. The court based this
conclusion on three considerations: (1) the purpose of the indeterminate sentence law
is to encourage rehabilitation by allowing for mitigation of a punishment which
would otherwise be imposed, and the validity of such an incentive system depends on
the legislature's power to prescribe the described maximum term; (2) the actual opera-
tion of the indeterminate sentence program provides that the Adult Authority can
extend a previously fixed lesser term to a new term to and including the statutory
maximum at any time prior to the prisoner's final discharge; and (3) the law has
been upheld against various constitutional challenges, including ones based on the
separation of powers and due process clauses, on the ground that the indeterminate
sentence is in legal effect a sentence for the maximum term. Id. at 416-17, 503 P.2d
at 925, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 221. Thus, section 671 of the Penal Code provides:
Whenever any person is declared punishable for a crime by imprisonment in
the state prison for a term not less than any specified number of years, and no
limit to the duration of such imprisonment is declared, punishment of such
offender shall be imprisonment during his natural life . . . . CAL. PEN. CODE §
671 (West 1972).
9. See In re Schoengarth, 66 Cal. 2d 295, 302, 425 P.2d 200, 204-05, 57 Cal. Rptr.
600, 604-05 (1967); In re Cowen, 27 Cal. 2d 637, 641, 166 P.2d 279, 281 (1946); In
re Lee, 177 Cal. 690, 692-93, 171 P. 958, 959 (1918).
10. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 6, provides: "[Nlor shall cruel or unusual punishments
be inflicted . .. ."
11. 8 Cal. 3d at 424, 503 P.2d at 930, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 226. The court disap-
proved dictum in In re Garner, 179 Cal. 409, 414-15, 177 P. 162, 165 (1918), which
arguably suggests the contrary. 8 Cal. 3d at 424 n.15, 503 P.2d at 930 n.15, 105
Cal. Rptr. at 226 n.15.
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committed. However, the principle, derived from Justice Field's dissent
in the United States Supreme Court decision of O'Neil v. Vermont,"2
had been continually recognized in California cases testing the con-
stitutionality of the death penalty against the prohibition of cruel or
unusual punishment. 13  It had also been well-established in the federal
courts,' 4 and had been invoked repeatedly in the highest courts of
California's sister states. 15 Several months prior to Lynch, in People
v. Anderson.' the California Supreme Court recognized that "punish-
ments of excessive severity for ordinary offenses" may be both cruel and
unusual.l1 In Lynch, the court declined to call a life sentence per se
"cruel or unusual" as a method of imposing punishment.' Rather, the
court held that the life sentence was cruel or unusual because it was
grossly disproportionate to the crime committed. 9 This interpretation
recognizes a distinction between the method of punishment, such as
torture or death, which has traditionally been thought to invoke the
prohibitions of the cruel or unusual punishment clause, and the length
of sentence, which heretofore has not been considered by the California
court in the context of cruel or unusual punishment.20 The Lynch
12. 144 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting). In O'Neil, a New York
liquor dealer sent individual jugs of liquor by common carrier to persons in Vermont,
a "dry" state, who had ordered them in New York where such sale was legal. The
United States Supreme Court refused to consider whether a sentence of a fine of over
$6000 or 54 years at hard labor constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Justice
Field dissented, suggesting that the sentence was excessively severe and was therefore
cruel and unusual. He recognized that what might be considered cruel and unusual
punishment was not confined to rack and screw methods of punishment, but logically
extended to sentences severely disproportionate to the crime charged. Id.
13. People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 643-44, 493 P.2d 880, 890, 100 Cal. Rptr.
152, 162 (1972); People v. Oppenheimer, 156 Cal. 733, 737-38, 106 P. 74, 77 (1909);
In re Finley, 1 Cal. App. 198, 201-02, 81 P. 1041, 1042-43 (1905).
14. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 280 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); Trop
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 353 (1910);
O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting); Ralph v.
Warden, 438 F.2d 786, 789 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 942 (1972).
15. State v. Evans, 245 P.2d 788, 792 (Idaho 1952); Dembowski v. State, 240
N.E.2d 815, 817-18 (Ind. 1968); Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374, 377-
78 (Ky. 1968); People v. Lorentzen, 194 N.W.2d 827, 829-31 (Mich. 1972); Cannon
v. Gladden, 281 P.2d 233, 234-35 (Ore. 1955); State v. Kimbrough, 46 S.E.2d 273, 275
(S.C. 1948).
-16. 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972).
17. Id.. at 654, 493 P.2d at 897, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 169.
18. 8 Cal. 3d at 424, 503 P.2d at 930, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 226. In In re Rosencrantz,
205 Cal. 534, 537, 271 P. 902, 904 (1928), the court determined that a life sentence by
itself was not cruel or unusual punishment.
19. 8 Cal. 3d at 437, 503 P.2d at 939, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
20. Federal court recognition of length of sentence as a relevant factor began with
Justice Field's dissenting view in O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892), which later
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court reasoned, as did the United States Supreme Court in Weems v.
United States,2 that the length of sentence can constitute cruel or unusual
punishment, thereby enlarging the scope of article I, section 6 of the
California Constitution.2 However, proof that a sentence was merely
disproportionate to the crime committed is not a sufficient showing to
hold a statutory penalty unconstitutional. The Lynch court was careful
not to encroach upon the role of the legislature in enacting penal
statutes and in specifying punishment for crimes. 23  Accordingly, it
determined that it should not interfere with the legislative function unless
the statute prescribed a penalty so severe in relation to the offense that it
"shocks the conscience and offends the fundamental notions of human
dignity.1
24
Finding insufficient guidelines in California case law to determine
what constitutes gross disproportion, the court inquired into the tests
employed in other jurisdictions. Under those tests, a defendant is
required to show: (1) that there was a gross disparity between the
penalty and "the nature of the offense and/or the offender, with par-
ticular regard to the degree of danger both present to society"; 25 or
(2) that the penalty, when compared with punishments for more serious
offenses in the same jurisdiction, ought to be deemed excessive; 26 or
became the law in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). 8 Cal. 3d at 420-21,
503 P.2d at 927-28, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 223-24.
21. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). In Weems, a disbursing officer employed in a Philippine
government bureau was convicted of making two false entries in his cash books. The
Philippine statute he was convicted under prescribed a minimum sentence of 12 years
imprisonment in chains and hard and painful labor, with concomitant penalties of
fines, loss of certain civil rights, and perpetual surveillance. The Court held this to
be cruel and unusual punishment both as to its method and its sentence which was
severely disproportionate to the offense. Id. at 377.
22. 8 Cal. 3d at 424, 503 P.2d at 930, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
23. Id. at 414, 423-24, 503 P.2d at 923, 930, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 219, 226.
24. Id. at 424, 503 P.2d at 930, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
25. Id. at 425, 503 P.2d at 930, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 226; see Weems v. United States, 217
U.S. 349, 365-66 (1910) (12 years imprisonment at hard labor and in chains for two
false entries in government cash books); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 337-41
(1892) (Field, J., dissenting) ($6000 or 54 years at hard labor for unauthorized sale
of liquor); Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786, 793 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 408
U.S. 942 (1972) (death sentence for rape); Faulkner v. State, 445 P.2d 815, 818-19
(Alaska 1968) (36 year sentence on 8 bad check counts); Workman v. Common-
wealth, 429 S.W.2d 374, 378 (Ky. 1968) (life sentence without possibility of parole for
rape committed by juvenile defendants); People v. Lorentzen, 194 N.W.2d 827, 828
(Mich. 1972) (mandatory minimum 20 year sentence for sale of marijuana); State v.
Ward, 270 A.2d 1, 4-5 (N.J. 1970) (two to three years imprisonment for youthful
offenders for possession of marijuana).
26. 8 Cal. 3d at 426, 503 P.2d at 931, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 227; see Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 380 (1910) (12 years imprisonment at hard labor in chains for
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(3) that there is a gross disparity between the challenged penalty and
"the punishments prescribed for the same offense in other jurisdictions
having an identical or similar constitutional provision.""7
The court used all three tests to strike down the contested sentencing
provision of section 314 of the Penal Code. Applying the first test,
the court determined that Penal Code section 314 defined the crime of
indecent exposure as a mere "annoyance," which is not such a grave
danger to society as to warrant a prospective punishment of life im-
prisonment.28 Indeed, both at common law29 and under 80 years of
California statutory law,30 until the enactment of the present penalty
in 1952, indecent exposure was considered to be no more than a
nuisance, and was punished as a misdemeanor. Modern clinical studies
in psychiatry also corroborate the generally low-key approach taken by
legislatures in formulating an appropriate punishment for this crime,
typically characterizing indecent exposure "as a social nuisance"31 rather
than as conduct resulting in violence32 or involving a true victim.
3
two false entries in government cash books); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339
(1892) ($6000 or 54 years at hard labor for unauthorized sale of liquor); State v.
Evans, 245 P.2d 788, 793 (Idaho 1952) (life imprisonment for lewd and lascivious acts
upon a child); Dembowski v. State, 240 N.E.2d 815, 816-18 (Ind. 1968) (25 years
maximum sentence for robbery); People v. Lorentzen, 194 N.W.2d 827, 831-32 (Mich.
1972) (mandatory minimum 20 year sentence for sale of marijuana); State v. Driver,
78 N.C. 423, 426 (1878) (5 years in county jail for wife beating); Cannon v. Gladden,
281 P.2d 233, 235 (Ore. 1955) (life imprisonment for assault with intent to commit
rape).
27. 8 Cal. 3d at 427, 503 P.2d at 932, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 288; see Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 102-03 (1958); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 377 (1910);
Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786, 791-92 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 942
(1972;) State v. Evans, 245 P.2d 788, 792-93 & n.1 (Idaho 1952); People v. Loren-
tzen, 194 N.W.2d 827, 832 (Mich. 1972).
28. 8 Cal. 3d at 431, 503 P.2d at 935, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 231.
29. See ARcanoLD, CIMUNAL PLEADINGS, EVIDENCE AND PRACTICE 1241-42 (37th
ed. 1969); 2 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW 2048-51 (12 ed. 1932); Annot., 93 A.L.R.
996, 997-1001 (1934). In England, indecent exposure is still regulated under the
Vagrancy Act of 1824, 5 Geo. 4, c. 83, and Town Police Causes Act of 1847, 10 & 11
Vict., c. 89, § 28.
30. 8 Cal. 3d at 437, 503 P.2d at 939, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 235. The California
Legislative Revision Committee has introduced to the California Legislature a proposed
Criminal Code to replace a large part of the current Penal Code. Section 9312 of the
new code, if adopted, would return indecent exposure to its pre-1952 posture with no
enhanced penalty for second or subsequent offenses. S. 1506, Cal. Legis., Reg. Sess.
(1972).
31. Gigeroff, Mohr & Turner, Sex Offenders on Probation: The Exhibitionist, 32
FED. PnoB. 17, 21 (1968).
32. See REPORT OF KARL M. BOWMAN, MEDICAL SUPERINTENDENT OF THE LANGLEY
PORTER CLmC, 2 CAL. ASSEM. J., Reg. Sess. 2844, 2847 (1951) [hereinafter cited
as Bowman].
33. See MoHa, TURNER & JERRY, PEDoPInLIA AND EXHIBITIONISM 121 (1964). This
[Vol. 6
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Turning to the second test, the court observed that the penalty for
second-offense indecent exposure is much greater than the punishments
prescribed for many crimes in California which are far more serious. 4
The aggravated penalty is far greater than that imposed for violent
crimes against the person, 35 crimes indirectly yet extremely dangerous to
life and limb,36 crimes involving antisocial conduct in the realm of
sexual activities, 37 and crimes against children. 38  All but three of the
crimes in these categories do not involve an increased penalty for repeated
commission of the crime.39 The statutes which enhance the penalty for
a second offense have, with two exceptions, retained a reasonable
relationship between the penalties imposed for the first and subsequent
offenses.40 Only Penal Code sections 314 and 647a make the first
book indicates that the harm suffered by an individual exposed to exhibitionism in the
form of indecent exposure is likely to be minimal at best. Thus, it is suggested that
indecent exposure is more aptly described as a "victimless" crime. Cf. Guttmacher &
Weihofen, Sex Offenses, 43 J. CRlM. L.C. & P.S. 153, 154 (1952), wherein the authors
suggest that in reality sex offenders do not "progress from minor offenses like ex-
hibitionism to major offenses like forcible rape."
34. 8 Cal. 3d at 431, 503 P.2d at 935, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 231.
35. Cf. CAL. PEN. CODE § 193 (West 1972) (up to 15 years for manslaughter); id.
§ 217 (1-14 years for assault with intent to commit murder); id. § 208 (1-25 years
for kidnapping); id. § 204 (up to 14 years for mayhem); id. § 220 (1-20 years for
assault with intent to commit mayhem or robbery); id. § 244 (1-14 years for assault
with caustic chemicals with intent to injure or disfigure); id. § 241 (up to 2 years for
assault on a peace officer or fireman engaged in the performance of his duties).
36. Cf. CAL. PEN. CODE § 447a (West 1972) (2-20 years for arson); id. § 464 (10-40
years for burglary by torch or explosives); id. § 219.1 (1-14 years for wrecking a vehicle
of a common carrier causing bodily harm); id. § 246 (1-5 years for shooting at an
inhabited dwelling); id. § 347 (1-10 years for poisoning food or drink with the intent
to injure a human being); CAL. VEH. CODE ANN. § 23101 (West 1971) (up to 5 years
for drunk driving causing bodily injury).
37. Cf. CAL. PEN. CODE § 220 (West 1972) (1-20 years for assault with intent to
commit rape or sodomy); id. § 265 (2-14 years for forcible abduction for purposes of
defilement); id. § 266a (up to 5 years for abduction for prostitution); id. § 266e,
266f (up to 5 years for purchasing or selling a woman for prostitution); id. § 264
(up to 50 years for statutory rape).
38. Cf. CAL. PEN. CODE § 273a, 273d (West 1972) (up to 10 years for willful
infliction of unjustifiable pain on a child likely to produce great bodily harm, trauma
or death).
39. 8 Cal. 3d at 434, 503 P.2d at 937, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 233. Kidnapping, arson
and assault with intent to commit murder do involve an increased penalty, but only
after the third separate conviction. CAL. PEN. CODE § 644 (West 1972).
40. Cf. CAL. PEN. CODE § 415.5 (West 1972) (distrubing peace on college campus:
first offense-$200 and/or up to 90 days, second offense-$500 and/or up to 180
days); id. § 12022 (commission of a felony armed with a deadly weapon: first offense
-5 to 10 years, second offense-10 to 15 years, third offense-15 to 25 years); id.
§ 71 (threatening public officials with bodily injury: first offense-Lfine and/or up, to
5 years, second offense-up to 5 years).
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offense a misdemeanor and the second offense a prospective life sent-
ence.
4 1
Finally, Justice Mosk pointed out that indecent exposure statutes in
virtually every other state and in the District of Columbia have treated
initial and subsequent offenses of indecent exposure as adequately and
appropriately controlled by a short jail sentence and/or a small fine."2
One question which might be asked concerning Lynch is whether the
court has seriously interfered with the broad discretion accorded the
legislature in California's tripartite system of government in enacting
penal statutes and specifying punishment. The court impliedly indicates
it will act as a check on the legislature when that body seemingly over-
reacts to the emotional outcry of its constituency by enacting stricter
penalties into California's sex offense statutes.43 The legislature finds
its justification for such reaction in cases like People v. Stroble.44 There,
the sexual abuse and murder of a child engendered community fears
resulting in a public demand for extreme regulatory provisions .4 Less
than one month after the Stroble incident occurred, Governor Earl
Warren proclaimed the First Extraordinary Session of 1949, the stated
purpose of which was in part to consider and enact stricter legislation
to curb sex offenders. 46 The result was an increased penalty for viola-
41. CAL. PEN. CODE § 647a (West 1972) provides:
Every person who annoys or molests any child under the age of 18 is a vagrant
and is punishable upon first conviction by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars
. . or by imprisonment in the county jail for not exceeding six months or by
both such fine and imprisonment and is punishable upon the second and each
subsequent conviction or upon the first conviction after a previous conviction
under Section 288 of this code by imprisonment in the state prison for not less than
one year.
42. 8 Cal. 3d at 436, 503 P.2d at 938-39, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 234-35. Only Michigan
permits a life sentence for second offenders. MICH. STAT. ANN., CaMES § 28.567(1)
(1972). The Lynch opinion incorrectly states that Oklahoma, which actually prescribes
a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment, also allows a life sentence. OKLA. STAT.
ANN., CRIMES & PUNISHMENTS § 1021 (West Supp. 1972).
43. Cf. Guttmacher & Weihofen, Sex Offenses, 43 J. Caim. L.C. & P.S. 153 (1952).
44. 36 Cal. 2d 615, 226 P.2d 330 (1951).
45. Nevertheless, the Stroble court denied the defendant's contention that the jury
had been improperly influenced adversely to him because of the atmosphere of public
pressure and sensational publicity throughout the trial. Id. at 620-21, 226 P.2d at 333-34.
46. See ch. 12, § 2, [1949] Cal. Stat. 1st Extr. Sess. 26-27; ch. 13, § 2, [1949] Cal.
Stat. 1st Extr. Sess. 28; ch. 14, § 2, [1949] Cal. Stat. 1st Extr. Sess. 29; ch. 16, § 2,
[1949] Cal. Stat. 1st Extr. Sess. 30. The legislative rationale underlying the immediate
adoption of these urgency measures was the following:
The number and nature of sexual crimes has increased within recent months to
such an extent as to pose a threat to the health, welfare and safety of the citizenry
of this State. The extent and seriousness of this situation is evidenced by the fact
that the Governor of the State has called an extraordinary session of the Legisla-
ture to consider and act upon legislation relating to sex offenses. To afford
immediate protection to the citizens, it is necessary that this act shall take effect
immediately. Ch. 13, § 2, [1949] Cal. Stat. 1st Extr. Sess. 28.
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tion of Penal Code section 647a47 and the amendment of Penal Code
section 290 to provide stringent requirements for registration of sex
offenders.4 Similarly, the case of People v. McCracken,4" involving
a similar set of facts, precipitated widespread indignation by Orange
County residents which persisted from the time of the incident in May,
1951, until the case was finally disposed of in June, 1952. McCracken
was in large part responsible for the convening of the First Extraordinary
Session of 1952 (March) by Governor Warren, which resulted in the
enactment of penalties in Penal Code sections 31150 (now section 314)
and 647a.51 The California Legislature persists in maintaining the
present penalties in the face of modern clinical studies which charac-
terize the proclivities of the indecent exposer as something decidedly
less than dangerous.5" The legislature rejected the recommendations of
the 1967 Joint Legislative Committee for Revision of the Penal Code,
which would have mitigated the present punishment for the first and
subsequent offenses of indecent exposure by relegating them to mis-
demeanor status.53 It is questionable whether the Lynch court should
have entered the legislative province with the knowledge that the legis-
lature was presently considering the 1972 legislative studies on the
Criminal Code, which would return Penal Code section 314 to its pre-
1952 posture.54 More appropriately, the court should have deferred
47. Ch. 14, § 1, [1949] Cal. Stat. 1st Extr. Sess. 28-29 (codified at CAL. PEN. CODE
§ 647a (West 1972)).
48. Ch. 13, § 1, [1949] Cal. Stat. 1st Extr. Sess. 27-28 (codified at CAL. PEN. CODE
§ 290 (West 1972)).
49. 39 Cal. 2d 336, 246 P.2d 913 (1952).
50. Ch. 23, § 4, [1952] Cal. Stat. 1st Extr. Sess. 381-82 (codified at CAL. PEN. CODE
§ 314 (1972)).
51. Ch. 23, § 5, [1952] Cal. Stat. 1st Extr. Sess. 382 (codified at CAL. PEN. CODE
§ 647a (West 1972)).
52. See Bowman, supra note 32, at 2847; Gigeroff, Mohr & Turner, Sex Offenders
on Probatiorn The Exhibitionist, 32 FED. PROB. 17, 19-21 (1968); Guttmacher &
Weihofen, Sex Offenses, 43 J. CaLM. L.C. & P.S. 153, 153-54 (1952).
53. The committee recommended:
A person commits a misdemeanor if, for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the
sexual desire of any person, including the actor, he exposes his genitals or performs
any other lewd act under circumstances in which his conduct is likely to be ob-
served by any person who would be offended or alarmed. Penal Code Revision
Project § 1609 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1967).
54. See note 30 supra and accompanying text. Proposed section 9313 provides:
(a) A person is guilty of indecent exposure when, for the purpose of arousing or
gratifying the sexual desire of any person exposes his private parts in any public
place or in any place open to public view.
(b) This section shall not apply to a presentation in place where children are
excluded.
(c) Indecent exposure is a misdemeanor of the second degree. S. 1506, Cal.
Legis., Reg. Sess. (1972).
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deciding the case on constitutional grounds and utilized the alternative
methods, discussed below, for resolving the case in Lynch's favor.
Application of the judicial doctrine of "last resort" suggests that,
whenever possible, it is preferable to resolve an issue by non-constitu-
tional means.5 5 It is arguable that the Lynch court should have applied
this concept by utilizing appropriate alternative means of dealing with
the petitioner's claim. 58 In effect, preservation of the penalty portion
of the statute would have resulted in the correct judicial approach in
light of the "last resort" doctrine, which acknowledges a role of the
legislature which is consistent with separation of powers. In addition,
it would have maintained a viable means for dealing with those offenders
who, unlike Lynch, are not innocuous.55
There are two approaches, not mentioned in the opinion, which the
court could have utilized: (1) a writ of habeas corpus to command
the California Adult Authority to grant the petitioner parole or (2)
a writ of administrative mandamus to effect the same result. Either
approach would focus on a judicial examination of the scope of the
discretion exercised in the decisions of the Adult Authority. The Adult
Authority is an administrative agency within the Department of Cor-
rections5" and, as such, it is governed by the principles which are com-
mon to all other administrative agencies within California. Unlike
those other agencies, its acknowledged broad discretion in determining
the length of a convicted defendant's sentence has been relatively im-
pervious to challenge.60 Very recently, the California Supreme Court
55. Bell v. Superior Court, 150 Cal. 31, 35, 87 P. 1031, 1033 (1906); Estate of
Damon, 10 Cal. App. 542, 544, 102 P. 684, 685 (1909).
56. Justice Mosk's statement that it is not proper to judicially interfere with the
legislative function "unless a statute prescribes a penalty 'out of all proportion to the
offense"' (8 Cal. 3d at 424, 503 P.2d at 930, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 226, quoting Robinson
v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring)) should be additionally
qualified to prohibit unwarranted intrusion by the judiciary where other forms of
resolving the issue exist. See text accompanying notes 59-72 infra.
57. CAr.. Co NsT. art 3, § 1, states:
The powers of the state government are legislative, executive, and judicial.
Persons charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either of the
others except as permitted by this Constitution.
58. Dr. Alfred Kinsey has estimated that only 5% of convicted sex offenders are so
dangerous as to exercise force or injury upon a victim. See Tappan, Some Myths About
the Sex Offender, 19 FED. PROB. 7 (1955). Query whether 5% isn't a significant
number?
59. 8 Cal. 3d at 415, 503 P.2d at 924, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 220; see CA1. PEN. CODE
§§ 5001, 5075-82 (West 1972).
60. See In re Schoengarth, 66 Cal. 2d 295, 425 P.2d 200, 57 Cal. Rptr. 600 (1967)
(denial of writ of habeas corpus which challenged power of Adult Authority to con-
dition its offer of parole on prisoner's agreeing to be released to custody of representa-
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affirmed the principle that the Adult Authority can be compelled to
review a petitioner's application for parole when it has abused its dis-
cretion by refusing to do so. 61  Because statutory authorization gives
the Adult Authority exclusive jurisdiction to fix a prisoner's sentence,62
no case has expanded this rule prohibiting abuse of discretion to require
that a petitioner be granted parole outright. However, this does not
preclude the court from declaring on remand to the Adult Authority
what properly would not be an abuse of discretion. This, in effect,
would be tantamount to an instruction that parole be granted.
Such an argument would parallel the one made unsuccessfully before
the California court of appeal in In re Wilkerson.63 Wilkerson chal-
lenged alleged "arbitrary and capricious" conduct on the part of the
Adult Authority by way of writ of habeas corpus to command the
Adult Authority to grant him parole. 64  In exercising its discretion, the
Adult Authority purported to consider his conduct while incarcerated,
the nature of his offense, his age, his prior associations, his habits, incli-
nations and traits of character, the probability of his reformation and
the interests of public security.65 Dicta in Wilkerson indicated that it
would be a misuse of power by the courts to interfere when the Adult
Authority had exercised its discretionary judgment based on these fac-
tors, unless there was an abuse of such discretion.66 The Wilkerson
court denied the petitioner's writ because the Adult Authority had
properly considered his past social history of felony convictions for
armed robbery and breaking and entering with intent to commit lar-
ceny.
67
tive of a sister state for trial on charges pending against him in that state); In re
Streeter, 66 Cal. 2d 47, 423 P.2d 976, 56 Cal. Rptr. 824 (1967) (denial of writ of
habeas corpus which sought to have prior convictions withdrawn from the considera-
tion of the Adult Authority in its administration of petitioner's sentence); In re
Wilkerson, 271 Cal. App. 2d 798, 77 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1969) (writ of habeas corpus to
compel Adult Authority to grant petitioner parole denied where petitioner charged
abuse of discretion by the agency); cf. In re Minnis, 7 Cal. 3d 639, 498 P.2d 997, 102
Cal. Rptr. 749 (1972) (writ of habeas corpus issued to compel Adult Authority to
consider petitioner's application for parole where Adult Authority abused its discretion
by fixing his sentence at maximum, denying him parole, and declaring that future
applications would not be considered); Roberts v. Duffy, 167 Cal. 629, 140 P. 260
(1914) (writ of mandate ordered to compel state board of prison directors to receive
and file applications of petitioner for release on parole).
61. In re Minnis, 7 Cal. 3d 639, 498 P.2d 997, 102 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1972).
62. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 5077, 3020 (West 1972).
63. 271 Cal. App. 2d 798, 77 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1969).
64. Id. at 803, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 343.
65. Id. at 804, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 343-44.
66. Id. at 804, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
67. Id.
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If the issue in Lynch had been whether the Adult Authority abused
its discretion, it is arguable on the facts that the result would have been
different from Wilkerson. Lynch was notably an innocuous perpe-
trator of a non-violent "victimless" crime. Particularly apropos are the
remarks of the trial judge at the conclusion of the trial:
"Mr. Lynch ...you are a man of great potential. You are a person
of unusual appearance, you make a very pleasant appearance, ob-
viously have the capacity to get along well with people, you are obvi-
ously a person of superior intellect."
68
Justice Mosk observed:
The circumstances of the offense do not undermine [the trial judge's]
appraisal. This is not a case, for example, in which an exhibitionist
forced himself on large numbers of the public by cavorting naked on a
busy street at high noon. Indeed, a very different picture emerges.
For this single act petitioner has now spent more than five years in
state prison-three and a half of those years in the maximum security
confines of Folsom. The Adult Authority has four times denied him
release on parole, and has never fixed his sentence at any term less than
the life maximum prescribed by section 314.
We recite these facts simply to illustrate the vast disproportion be-
tween the conduct of which petitioner was convicted and the punishment
he has suffered-and still faces.
69
This appraisal suggests that it would arguably not have been a misuse of
the court's power to compel the Adult Authority, by writ of habeas
corpus, to release Lynch on parole unless the Authority could present
reasonable grounds for his continued incarceration." ° In re Lynch
would have been an ideal setting for such an extension of judicial doc-
trine.
Similarly, a writ of administrative mandamus to compel the Adult
68. 8 Cal. 3d at 437, 503 P.2d at 939, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
69. Id. at 437-38, 503 P.2d at 939-40, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 235-36.
70. Lynch asserted in one of his petitions that the Adult Authority had based its
repeated denials of parole on (1) alleged additional acts of indecent exposure which
he had not been given an opportunity to rebut and (2) his steadfast refusal to confess
to committing those acts. Id. at 439 n.26, 503 P.2d at 940 n.26, 105 Cal. Rptr. at
236 n.26. He maintained that, as such, the denials deprive him of due process and
equal protection of the law. Id.; cf. Note, An Endorsement of Due Process Reform
in Parole Revocation: Morrissey v. Brewer, 6 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 157 (1973). The
Lynch court expressly refused to meet this constitutional issue. Perhaps the court
would not have been so reluctant to reach the underlying problem if it had been re-
formulated as a non-constitutional question of administrative law.
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Authority to grant the petitioner parole is an appropriate remedy for
any abuse of discretion by an administrative agency.71 Although the
Adult Authority has been insulated from its use in the past, the principles
exist and have been invoked successfully whenever an agency exercises
its power in a reputedly arbitrary or capricious fashion. 72
The court has shied away from an abuse of discretion approach,
thereby lending uncertainty to its prospective application, in favor of a
constitutional approach which sets the stage for broad application of a
constitutional rule. Arguably, the Lynch rationale may be applied to
violators of Penal Code section 647a who, like Lynch, have received a
prospective punishment of life imprisonment.7 3  In addition, the im-
plications of Lynch extend beyond mere sex offenses. Dicta in the
recent case of People v. Draper 4 suggests that there may be circum-
stances in which the Lynch holding would be applied to lesser included
offenses which carry a maximum sentence greater than that of the
principal offense. It would also be a logical extension to apply the
same reasoning to victimless crimes and other misdemeanor offenses
subject to judicial sentencing, when those sentences are grossly dispro-
portionate to the crime committed. In light of the potential impact of
71. CAL. CODE- OF Civ. PRoc. § 1094.5 (West 1967) provides in pertinent part:
(a) Where the writ is issued for the purpose of inquiring into the validity of
any final administrative order or decision made as the result of a proceeding in
which by law a hearing is required to be given ....
(b) Abuse of discretion is established if the respondent has not proceeded in
the manner required by law, the order or decision is not supported by the findings,
or the findings are not supported by the evidence ....
(e) The court shall enter judgment either commanding respondent to set aside
the order or decision, or denying the writ. Where the judgment commands that
the order or decision be set aside, it may order the reconsideration of the case in
the light of the court's opinion and judgment and may order respondent to take
such further action as is specially enjoined upon it by law but the judgment shall
not limit or control in any way the discretion legally vested in the respondent.
See W. DEERING, CALiORNu ADwMNiSTRATrVE MANDAVus 41 (C.E.B. 1966);
CALiFORNiA ADmImsmRATivE AGENCY PRACcTCE 253 (C.E.B. 1970); K. DAviS, An-
MNIRmmATvE IAw TEXr 460 (3rd ed. 1972).
72. Harris v. Alcholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 62 Cal. 2d 589, 400 P.2d
745, 43 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1965) (revocation of liquor license set aside as clear abuse of
discretion); Magit v. Board of Medical Examiners, 57 Cal. 2d 74, 366 P.2d 816, 17 Cal.
Rptr. 488 (1961) (revocation of physician's license too severe in view of mitigating cir-
cumstances).
73. Dicta in Lynch indicates that the same problem exists with Penal Code section
647a as did with Penal Code section 314. However, the court declined to advance an
opinion as to its future status. 8 Cal. 3d at 434, 503 P.2d at 937, 105 Cal. Rptr. at
233. See note 41 supra for the text of section 647a.
74. 29 Cal. App. 3d 465, 475, 105 Cal. Rptr. 653, 666 (1972) (Adult Authority ad-
vised that if maximum penalty on included offense conviction were not limited to less
than the maximum for the principal offense, it would result in an unconstitutional
sentence).
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In re Lynch, the legislature could profitably reconsider the present
system of incongruous penalties.75
Steven H. Kaufmann
75. Id. at 476-77, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 661. Compare CAL. PEN. CODE § 217 (West
1972) (14 years for assault with intent to commit murder) with id. § 221 (15 years
for assault with intent to commit any felony other than murder); id. § 220 (20 years
for assault with intent to commit rape, sodomy, mayhem, robbery or grand larceny); id.
§ 245 (life for assault with deadly weapon or by means likely to produce bodily
harm).
